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I.

Introduction

Grotian Moments are instances of accelerated formation of
customary law, sparked by significant world events, such as wars,
terrorist attacks, or natural catastrophes.1 This Article will apply the
Grotian Moment theory to the legal criteria of statehood, in an attempt
to assess whether an evolution in specific elements of statehood has
resulted in such paradigm-shifting Grotian Moments. In Part II, this
Article will analyze the Grotian Moment theory, while distinguishing it
from other types of customary law formation. Part III will focus on the
legal theory of statehood and each of its constitutive elements. Part IV
will discuss whether any such elements of statehood have evolved over
time, resulting in Grotian Moments. Finally, Part V will propose a
reconceptualization of the legal theory of statehood, in light of its
evolving criteria, which may have constituted Grotian Moments.

II. What Is a Grotian Moment?
Customary law typically evolves at a slow pace. The creation of a
customary norm may require decades, if not centuries, of consistent
State practice, coupled with the demonstration that the specific State
practice is being undertaken out of a sense of legal obligation (opinio

*

Milena Sterio is the Charles R. Emrick Jr.—Calfee Halter & Griswold
Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.

1.

Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the Grotian Moment: Accelerated Formation
of Customary International Law During Times of Fundamental Change,
43 CORNELL J. INT’L L. 439, 440 (2010).
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juris).2 In fact, Professor Myres McDougal of Yale Law School has
famously described the process of formation of customary law as one of
continuous claim and response.3 Consider the following example, as an
illustration of this lengthy process. State X may claim that it is allowed
to enter the territory of State Y, in order to arrest a terrorist leader,
without State Y’s consent. The claim would imply a change in the
existing rules of international law, which normally do not authorize
such a breach of State sovereignty.4 State Y, as well as other States,
may provide a response to this claim; if the response is overwhelmingly
positive, this would trigger the process of generating a new rule of
customary law. Through this process of claim and response, as well as
third-party State support, acquiescence, or repudiation, new rules of
customary law may emerge. “[A]s pearls are produced by the irritant
of a piece of grit entering an oyster’s shell, so the interactions and
mutual accommodations of States produce the pearl—so to speak—of
customary law.”5 Most scholars agree that no formula exists for
identifying how many States are needed and how many years must
elapse before a new rule of customary law is generated.6 However, most
scholars converge around the idea that many States’ acquiescence with
the new rule is required, and that such acquiescence must take place
over many years.7
Notwithstanding the normal processes of customary law creation,
cataclysmic world events, such as World War II, sometimes provoke a
rapid formation of customary norms. Some scholars have referred to
such transformative events as “International Constitutional Moments”
and have applied this label to the drafting of the United Nations

2.

See, e.g., G.I. Tunkin, Remarks on the Judicial Nature of Customary
Norms in International Law, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 419, 420 (1961); Manley
O. Hudson (Special Rapporteur on Article 24 of the Statute of the Int’l
Law Comm’n), Ways and Means for Making the Evidence of Customary
International Law More Readily Available, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/16 (Mar.
3, 1950); see also Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Stability and Change in
International Customary Law, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 279, 282 (2009).

3.

M.S. McDougal & N.A. Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective:
Lawful Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648, 656 (1955).

4.

See, e.g., Mary C. Tsai, Globalism and Conditionality: Two Sides of the
Sovereignty Coin, 31 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1317, 1319 (2000).

5.

MAURICE H. MENDELSON, THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW 190 (1998).

6.

Daniel M. Bodansky, The Concept of Customary International Law, 16
MICH. J. INT’L L. 667, 674 (1995).

7.

See e.g., Lazare Kopelmanas, Custom as a Means of the Creation of
International Law, 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 127, 129, 132 (1937).
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Charter and the creation of the Nuremberg tribunal.8 More recently,
Professors Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White have
referred to the term “constitutional moment” when arguing that the
September 11th attacks against the United States constituted a change
in the nature of future threats facing the international community,
thereby justifying the more rapid development of new rules of
customary law.9
In 1985, Richard Falk coined the term “Grotian Moment,” a
reference to Hugo Grotius, the seventeenth-century Dutch scholar
whose masterpiece, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, is widely considered the
foundation of modern-day international law.10 Grotian Moments are
paradigm-shifting instances of accelerated formation of customary law,
provoked by significant world events, such as wars, terrorism, natural
phenomena, or catastrophes.11 Grotian Moments are thus similar to
constitutional moments, but are to be distinguished from so-called
“instant customary international law,” a phenomenon advanced by
some scholars.12 Instant customary international law is a theory which
argues that State practice may not be necessary for the formation of
customary law, if States’ opinio juris is clearly demonstrated through

8.

For example, Jenny Martinez has written that the drafting of the U.N.
Charter was a “constitutional moment” in the history of international law.
Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 429, 463 (2003). Professor Leila Sadat has described Nuremberg as a
“constitutional moment for law.” Leila Nadya Sadat, Enemy Combatants
After Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Extraordinary Renditions, Torture, and Other
Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200, 1206
(2007).

9.

Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International
Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (2002); see also Ian
Johnstone, The Plea of “Necessity” in International Legal Discourse:
Humanitarian Intervention and Counter-Terrorism, 43 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 337, 370 (2005).

10.

See BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A
PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 1369 (3d ed. 1997). Grotius is widely
considered to be the founder of modern-day international law. See HEDLEY
BULL ET AL., HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2–3 (1992).
Other scholars have also used the term “Grotian Moment” more recently;
see also MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS 212 (2014);
Milena Sterio, Humanitarian Intervention Post-Syria: A Grotian Moment,
20 ILSA J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 343 (2014).

11.

Professor Michael Scharf has defined the term “Grotian Moment” as
follows: “a transformative development in which new rules and doctrines of
customary international law emerge with unusual rapidity and acceptance.”
Scharf, supra note 1, at 444.

12.

Id. at 446.
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General Assembly resolutions.13 Grotian Moments, unlike instant
customary international law, contemplate accelerated formation of
customary law through States’ widespread acceptance or endorsement
in response to other States’ acts.14
Scholars have identified several Grotian Moments: the creation of
the Nuremberg Tribunal; the formation of the law of the continental
shelf; the development of outer space law; and the emergence of
customary international humanitarian law in the wake of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)
trials.15 In addition, the existence of specific points in time when
customary law develops rapidly has been acknowledged by the Max
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. This highly reputable
publication has observed that “recent developments show that
customary rules may come into existence rapidly” and has further
explained:
This can be due to the urgency of coping with new developments
of technology, for instance, drilling technology as regards the rules
on the continental shelf, or space technology as regards the rule
on the freedom of extra-atmospheric space . . . Or it may be due
to the urgency of coping with widespread sentiments of moral
outrage regarding crimes committed in conflicts such as those in
Rwanda and Yugoslavia that brought about the rapid formation
of a set of customary rules concerning crimes committed in
internal conflicts.16

The Grotian Moment concept has several practical applications.
First, it can provide greater legitimacy to those new rules of customary
law which have formed with urgency and based on necessity. Second,
it can guide States when to seek General Assembly resolutions, as well
as how to ensure that such resolutions are drafted to position them as
a capstone of the formation of a new customary norm. Third, it can
strengthen a litigation case, by providing litigants with greater support
for their claim. And, fourth, it can encourage international courts to

13.

See Milena Sterio, Changes in the Legal Theory of Statehood, 39 DENV.
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 209, 213 (2011).

14.

Id. (“The Grotian Moment theory may thus rely on General Assembly
resolutions to a certain extent, to discover evidence of an emerging
customary norm, resulting from a period of fundamental change. Yet,
General Assembly Resolutions are purely one of the tools utilized by scholars
seizing a Grotian Moment.”).

15.

Michael P. Scharf, Accelerated Formation of Customary International
Law, 20 ILSA J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 305, 339 (2014); Boutros BoutrosGhali, A Grotian Moment, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1609, 1613 (1995).

16.

Tullio Treves, Customary International Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYC.
PUB. INT’L L. ¶ 24 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
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recognize a new norm of customary law in appropriate cases, despite
the lack of lengthy and uniform State practice.
With the above in mind, this Article examines whether the concept
of Grotian Moments applies within the theory of statehood. The next
section will analyze the legal theory of statehood while assessing
whether specific pillars of this theory have evolved over time and
whether its reconceptualization may give rise to a Grotian Moment.

III. Theory of Statehood
The positive law criteria of statehood stem from the 1933
Montevideo Convention, and include the following (1) a defined
territory; (2) a permanent population; (3) a government; and (4) the
capacity to enter into international relations.17 This Convention was
drafted purposefully to ignore the political reality of recognition.18 In
fact, the Montevideo Convention’s main proponents were Latin
American States, whose primary purpose was to shield the legal theory
of statehood from political influences of powerful States, by excluding
recognition as one of the foundational elements of statehood.19
According to the Montevideo Convention criteria, statehood is a legal
theory, distinct from the political act of State recognition.20 In other
words, when an entity satisfies the four legal criteria of statehood, it
ought to become a State, regardless of other States’ willingness to
recognize the emerging entity as a new sovereign partner. Unlike
statehood, recognition is a purely political act and depends entirely on
the governing regime and strategic interest of the recognizing State.21
Thus, an existing State could choose to treat an entity as a State
although the latter does not satisfy the four criteria of statehood. On
the contrary, an existing State could choose not to treat an entity as a
State although the latter does satisfy the four criteria of statehood.22
This view of recognition is referred to as the declaratory view, and it
follows from the above-mentioned distinction between the two theories,
statehood and recognition: the former is legal, whereas the latter is
political.23
17.

Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26,
1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention].

18.

Sterio, supra note 13, at 215–16.

19.

Id. at 216.

20.

Milena Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: “Selfistans,”
Secession and the Great Powers’ Rule, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 137, 148–50
(2010).

21.

Id. at 149.

22.

Id. at 149–50.

23.

Id. at 149.
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In contrast to the declaratory view, some support the so-called
constitutive view of recognition, under which recognition by outside
actors represents one of the main elements of statehood.24 An entity
cannot qualify as a State under this view unless external actors choose
to treat it as a State. Although the constitutive view is not supported
by most academics, this view has important practical implications:
While international recognition is no longer widely considered to
be a required element of statehood, in practice the ability to
exercise the benefits bestowed on sovereign states contained in
the Westphalian sovereignty package requires respect of those
doctrines and application of them to the state in question by other
states in the interstate system. In other words, states cannot exist
in a vacuum, and if no other state wishes to engage in
international relations with a particular entity, that entity will
never become a fully sovereign partner on the international
scene.25

In addition to the declaratory and constitutive theories of
recognition described above, an intermediary view posits that although
statehood and recognition are independent of one another, existing
States have a duty to recognize an emerging entity if the latter
objectively satisfies the four criteria of statehood.26
Regardless of which view of recognition one accepts, several
observations may be made about the linkage of statehood and
recognition.
First, the legal theory of statehood on its own seems only relevant
and applicable at the time of a State’s creation. Many “States” lack one
or more of the four attributes of statehood during their existence
without losing their statehood status.27 For example, several States,
including South Korea and North Korea, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and
Croatia and Slovenia, have disputed territorial borders and arguably do
not satisfy the statehood criterion of having a “defined territory.”28
Other States, such as Syria, Sudan, Iraq, or the Democratic Republic
of Congo, have experienced enormous migration and refugee crises,
rendering their populations non-permanent, and thereby not satisfying
their fulfillment of the “permanent population” criterion of statehood.
Moreover, States such as Somalia or Afghanistan have not had stable
24.

Id. at 150.

25.

Sterio, supra note 13, at 216.

26.

Id. at 215.

27.

Id. at 216. (“Minor cuts and bruises on the statehood shield do not affect
the protected state; it is only in rare cases when the entire structure crumbles
that a state may crumble and decompose into smaller units or become
absorbed by larger ones.”).

28.

Id.
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governments in place for the past several decades, putting into question
their satisfaction of the “government” criterion of the Montevideo
Convention statehood theory.29 Last, but certainly not least, many
small or micro States do not have the full capacity to enter into
international relations, because they delegate aspects of their
sovereignty to other States, such as national defense or trade.30 Yet,
these small States continue to be viewed and accepted as States, despite
the fact that they objectively fail to satisfy the fourth criterion of
statehood, the capacity to enter into international relations.31 Thus,
although statehood is a fundamental theory of international law, the
fulfillment of its four criteria seems to matter only at the beginning of
a State’s existence.
Second, the label of statehood is important. Statehood functions as
a sovereignty shield and protects its subject from external intervention.
A State, if attacked by others, can claim the sovereign right to selfdefense, or it can request the assistance of other States in collective selfdefense.32 A non-State cannot easily protect itself, a situation best
exemplified by the situation of Palestine. Because Palestine is not a
State, it remains subject to Israeli policies, as well as the latter’s
political, legal, and societal decisions which, some would argue, have
been harmful to the well-being of Palestinians.33 Along similar lines,
only a State can participate in regional military and mutual defense
alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (“NATO”)34 or
the Economic Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”).35
Moreover, the label of statehood allows States to participate in world
organizations where major legal and political decisions are continuously
undertaken, such as the United Nations; regional organizations such as
the European Union, the Organization of American States, or the
Organization of African Unity; and more specialized organizations such

29.

Id. at 217.

30.

Id.

31.

Id.

32.

This assertion is based upon the United Nations Charter’s right of selfdefense, in Article 51, as well on customary law of self-defense. U.N. Charter
art. 2, ¶ 4; see also U.N. Charter art. 51; IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963).

33.

See George E. Bisharat, Israel’s Invasion of Gaza in International Law, 38
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 41, 47–50 (2009), for a detailed account of the
Israel-Palestine conflict in Gaza. See Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN AFF., https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/isr
aeli-palestinian-conflict [https://perma.cc/XF69-GYR5], for a general
discussion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

34.

Sterio, supra note 13, at 219.

35.

Id.
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as the World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization, or
the World Intellectual Property Organization.36
Third, as the following section will outline, State practice suggests
that emerging entities cannot exist as States in a vacuum. Despite the
fact that an entity objectively satisfies the four elements of statehood,
such objective fulfillment of statehood criteria remains meaningless
absent some existing States’ willingness to accept the entity as a new
State. For example, Nagorno-Karabakh, a Caucasus region disputed
between Azerbaijan and Armenia, has declared its independence in the
early 1990s.37 No other State in the international arena recognized the
declaration of independence, and as of now, Nagorno-Karabakh remains
de jure a part of Azerbaijan (although this is disputed by Armenia).38
Similarly, two other Caucasus provinces, South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
have declared independence from Georgia without international
recognition; as of today, the provinces remain de jure part of Georgian
territorial borders.39 Recent unsuccessful secession attempts by
Kurdistan and Catalonia further underscore this point: a statehoodseeking entity must garner the support of other States in the
international arena, regardless of whether such an entity satisfies the
objective criteria of statehood.40 Expressed differently, the four criteria
of statehood may be the starting point on the path to statehood, but
recognition by existing States represents a necessary ingredient for the
ultimate realization of statehood.

IV. Grotian Moments and Statehood
It may be argued that the legal theory of statehood has evolved
over time, and that such changes constitute Grotian Moments. While
no specific cataclysmic world event can be designated as the catalyst
36.

Id. (“Non-state entities are limited in their ability to influence the
development of international law, to protest against existing international
legal rules, or to lobby powerful states to engage in certain behaviors on
the international scene.”).

37.

Nagorno-Karabakh Profile, BBC (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-18270325 [https://perma.cc/N5KN-4Y4A].

38.

Nagorno-Karabakh, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/Na
gorno-Karabakh [https://perma.cc/W9V3-LTJ7].

39.

Jakub Lachert, Post-Soviet Frozen Conflicts: A Challenge for European
Security, WARSAW INST. (Mar. 14, 2019), https://warsawinstitute.org/post
-soviet-frozen-conflicts-challenge-european-security/ [https://perma.cc/2G
Q6-A857].

40.

Milena Sterio, Self-Determination and Secession Under International Law:
The Cases of Kurdistan and Catalonia, 22 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. ASIL
INSIGHTS (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/22/issue/1
/self-determination-and-secession-under-international-law-cases-kurdistan
[https://perma.cc/2CTS-RR82].
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for these Grotian Moments, the overall trend of globalization, coupled
with the proliferation of international legal norms and institutions, may
provide explanation for the evolving theory of statehood. While the
Montevideo Convention theory of statehood sufficed in the 1930s, it
may be argued that this theory no longer corresponds to the reality of
State creation and State existence in the twenty-first century. States in
today’s world co-depend on each other, as well as on meddling
international institutions and legal norms. Thus, the objective criteria
of statehood, as espoused in the Montevideo Convention, do not
encompass the modern world’s criteria of statehood. The following
section will analyze such alterations in the theory of statehood,
including the relationship between State sovereignty and intervention,
secessionist movements which may alter State sovereignty, the
emergence of de facto States, and the proliferation of regional and
international organizations and legal norms. These changes in the
theory of statehood may constitute Grotian Moments.
State sovereignty is an elusive and criticized concept. Yet, in its
most traditional iteration, State sovereignty implies an equality of
States within the international community, a general prohibition on
foreign interference with internal affairs, territorial integrity, and an
inviolability of international borders.41 The contours of State
sovereignty have shifted over time, and today some States enjoy a
higher degree of sovereignty than others, due to their powerful economic
and military status.42 These super-sovereign States include permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council (United States, United
Kingdom, France, Russia and China), who enjoy unilateral veto power
through their institutional status on the Security Council.43 Additional
super-sovereign States include Italy, Germany and Japan, in light of
their wealth and military capability, as well as non-declared nuclear
States such as India, Pakistan, and Israel.44 “Rogue” nations such as
North Korea or Iran may also be viewed as super-sovereign, because of
their unpredictable and threatening leadership and potential military
threat to their neighboring countries.45
41.

Daniel Philpott, Sovereignty, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL. (June 22, 2020),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/ [https://perma.cc/7559HVFN].

42.

See Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: “Involuntary
Sovereignty Waiver”: Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Return
to Rule by the Great Powers?, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361,
365–66 (2005).

43.

U.N. Charter art. 23, ¶ 1; U.N. Charter art. 27.

44.

See DIEGO LOPES DA SILVA ET AL., STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RSCH. INST.,
TRENDS IN WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURE 2020 (2021); see also Status of
World Nuclear Forces, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, https://fas.org/issues/nucle
ar-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/ [https://perma.cc/Z5JY-SGTV].

45.

See Kelly, supra note 42, at 404.
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This pecking order of States, has resulted in a Grotian Moment:
the fourth criterion of statehood (capacity to enter into international
relations) is no longer an objective criterion but rather a capacity
directly linked to the given State’s degree of sovereignty. In particular,
less-sovereign States seem dependent on the super-sovereign States for
their exercise of international relations. Super-sovereign States seem to
dictate and orchestrate the course of action of less-sovereign States on
the world scene. For example, super-sovereign States often pressure
less-sovereign States into voting a specific way within the United
Nations, as well as other international organizations.46 Moreover, supersovereign States often interfere in the affairs of less-sovereign States,
through military intervention. Over the past several decades, supersovereign States have launched military interventions on the territory
of other States, often under the guise of humanitarian intervention. An
intervention on behalf of the Kurds in Iraq took place in the early 1990s,
a NATO-led intervention took place on the territory of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (“FRY”) in 1999, and most recently, the United
Kingdom, France, and the United States used air strikes against Syrian
leadership.47 Support for the legality of humanitarian interventions has
been growing in the international community.48 The air strikes against
Syria, for example, were accompanied by official rationales from the
46.

See Samuel Brazys & Diana Panke, Why Do States Change Positions in
the United Nations General Assembly?, 38 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 70, 79–80
(2017).

47.

See Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Judicial Underpinnings, 31
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 373, 383 (2003), for an overview on the
intervention to support the Kurds in Iraq. See Thomas M. Franck, Lessons
of Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 857, 857–58, 860 (1999) and Louis Henkin,
Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention”, 93 AM. J. INT’L L.
824, 826 (1999), for an overview on the 1999 NATO-led air strikes against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“FRY”); See Press Release, Security
Council, Following Air Strikes against Suspected Chemical Weapons Sites
in Syria, Security Council Rejects Proposal to Condemn Aggression, U.N.
Press Release SC/13296 (Apr. 14, 2018), https://www.un.org/press/en/20
18/sc13296.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/LDZ3-8T6U] [hereinafter Following
Air Strikes], for information on the 2018 air strikes against Syria.

48.

Several scholars had supported the legality of the 1999 NATO-led air strikes
against the FRY. See e.g., Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We
Moving Towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian
Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 25–29
(1999); Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of
International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 847, 855–56 (1999). The recent Stateled legal support of humanitarian intervention in Syria, through the French,
United Kingdom, and U.S.-led air strikes in 2018, further exemplifies the
growing international consensus regarding the legality of humanitarian
intervention. See, e.g., Following Air Strikes, supra note 47 (reporting that
the United Kingdom had stated at the Security Council meeting that “any
State was permitted under international law to take measures to alleviate
extreme humanitarian suffering.”).
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U.K. government that humanitarian intervention is legal, and an
exception to the general ban on the use of force under international
law.49 While it is possible to accept and defend the humanitarian
character of each of these interventions, it should be noted that such
interventions are always launched by super-sovereign States against
weaker States, and that the acceptance of such interventions within the
international community signals an erosion of the traditional concept
of State sovereignty and a weakening of the target State’s capacity to
engage in international relations. This changing nature of State
sovereignty—the sliding scale of States’ ability to conduct themselves
as they wish in their external relations—may constitute a Grotian
Moment.
Under traditional international law, a fundamental pillar of State
sovereignty is the notion of territorial integrity—that borders, once
formally established, are inviolable.50 The norm of territorial integrity
of States is present in treaty law, such as in the United Nations Charter
itself, as well as in customary law.51 Territory is one of the main criteria
of statehood under the Montevideo Convention.52 Over the past several
decades, the principles of territorial integrity and the sanctity of State
borders have been under pressure, due to norms protecting human and
group rights. States have been subject to external interventions if they
abuse and oppress minority rights within their borders. The best
example of this is the 1999 NATO air strikes against the territory of
the FRY, mentioned above, over the FRY’s abuses of human rights in
Kosovo.53 Following the air strikes, Kosovo was administered by the
United Nations, and in 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared
independence.54 Although Kosovo has to this date not become a member
of the United Nations,55 it has functioned as a State and has been
49.

See Following Air Strikes, supra note 47.

50.

Philpott, supra note 41.

51.

U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; see also Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab
Republic/Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 72 (Feb. 3) (“Once agreed, the
boundary stands, for any other approach would vitiate the fundamental
principle of the stability of boundaries, the importance of which has been
repeatedly emphasized by the Court.”).

52.

See Derek Wong, Sovereignty Sunk? The Position of ‘Sinking States’ at
International Law, 14 MELB. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2013).

53.

IAIN KING & WHIT MASON, PEACE AT ANY PRICE: HOW THE WORLD FAILED
KOSOVO 43–45 (2006) (describing the events leading up to the NATO air
strikes in the former Yugoslavia).

54.
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TIMES (Feb. 18, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/18/world/eu
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55.

See United Nations Member States, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/me
mber-states [https://perma.cc/ZF6N-QXMH].

81

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Vol. 54 (2022)
Grotian Moments and Statehood

recognized by over one hundred other sovereign States.56 Because of its
abuse of human rights, the FRY (now Serbia) has lost a part of its
territory.57 The respect for the territorial integrity “can be trumped by
the need to protect and advance minority rights, even at the expense
of altering territorial borders of the mother state.”58 Conversely, it
appears that the respect for minority and human rights has become a
de facto requirement for the preservation of a State’s territory.59 Thus,
the criterion of territory for the legal theory of statehood could be reenvisaged as “territory, unless the state abuses human or group
rights.”60
De facto States are entities which satisfy the four criteria of
statehood from the Montevideo Convention, but remain unrecognized
because of political or other reasons. Carnegie Europe notes:
The term refers to a place that exercises internal sovereignty over
its citizens but is not recognized by most of the world as the de
jure legal authority in that territory. In each case, the de facto
state broke away from a parent state that is internationally
recognized and still claims sovereignty.61

Unrecognized State-like entities are denied membership in international
organizations and are unable to engage in international relations.62
Examples of such de facto States include Taiwan, Northern Cyprus,
Republika Srpska, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.63
Taiwan has been a de facto State since the late 1940s, when the
Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek fled from China to Taiwan.64
Most western States supported Taiwan in the first two decades of its
existence. But starting in the early 1970s, most States recognized the
56.
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ate.gov/u-s-relations-with-kosovo [https://perma.cc/GWY4-M7BJ].

57.

See Bilefsky, supra note 54.

58.
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Id. at 226. (“The Grotian Moment with respect to minority rights and its
impact on the legal theory of statehood resides in the growing acceptance
of secession, and the notion that if minority rights are abused by the mother
state, the latter forfeits the right to have its territorial integrity respected,
thereby inviting outside intervention.”).

61.

THOMAS DE WAAL, UNCERTAIN GROUND: ENGAGING WITH EUROPE’S DE
FACTO STATES AND BREAKAWAY TERRITORIES 9 (2018).
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See id. at 6.
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See id.

64.
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People’s Republic of China as the official government of China. Yet,
most western States have continued to maintain trade and other
diplomatic ties with Taiwan. The island remains a de facto State: it has
a defined territory, government, population, and some capacity to enter
into international relations.65 For political reasons, however, Taiwan
has never been recognized as a State.66 Northern Cyprus was invaded
by Turkey in 1974; since then, Northern Cyprus has functioned as a
separate entity, unrecognized by most other countries and thus unable
to engage in meaningful international relations.67 However, Northern
Cyprus does have a territory, population, government, and the
potential capacity to engage in international relations.68 Republika
Srpska is de jure a part of Bosnia-Herzegovina but has, since the civil
war in the 1990s, functioned as a de facto State, with a separate system
of law enforcement, education, and local government.69 The entity
remains unrecognized for political reasons. Because Republika Srpska
is supported by Serbia, and deemed by most western nations to be the
culprit for the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s, those same States fear that
the recognition of Republika Srpska would lead to an expansion of
Serbia.70 However, like Taiwan and Northern Cyprus, it has a defined
territory, population, government, and the capacity to enter into
international relations with other States—if the latter chose to
recognize it.71 Finally, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are provinces within
Georgia.72 Starting in 2008, the two provinces broke away from Georgia
and proclaimed their independence.73 They have remained unrecognized
because both appear to be heavily influenced by Russia, and most
western States are fearful of further Russian expansion into the
Caucasus and a weakening of their NATO ally, Georgia. Yet, the two
provinces have a territory, government, population, and capacity to
enter into international relations.74 The above examples demonstrate
65.

See What’s Behind the China-Taiwan Divide?, BBC NEWS, https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-asia-34729538 [https://perma.cc/P6QM-27KY].
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(Oct. 4, 2011), https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/b
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that the application of the legal theory of statehood would result in the
bestowing of the statehood label upon these four State-like entities.
From this, it may be argued that a Grotian Moment has occurred in
the legal theory of statehood: that the theory now comprises a fifth
element, which is recognition by other powerful States.
In light of increasing globalization, international law has
transformed itself from a set of legal norms governing inter-State
relations to a complex web of transnational documents, providing a
framework for all sorts of different actors in the international arena.
Domestic law has lost its “sovereign” power and is now often
supplemented and corrected by international legal norms.75 Some
scholars may argue that this proliferation of international legal norms
has eroded traditional State sovereignty: “The traditional Westphalian
notion of sovereignty by which a state had absolute territorial control
and the right to exercise domestic powers free from external constraints
has, in large part, become unrecognizable.”76 For example, as mentioned
above, a State which abuses human rights may be subject to
intervention by other States. A State which engages in a harmful trade
practice may be sanctioned by the World Trade Organization.77 If a
State violates intellectual property protections, it may become subject
of World Intellectual Property Organization fines and other coercive
measures.78 This emerging requirement that States behave in a specific
manner in the international arena, respect international legal norms,
and a global code of conduct constitutes a Grotian Moment. Moreover,
international law has witnessed a proliferation in the number of
international organizations, such as the United Nations; regional
organizations and alliances such as the European Union, NATO, the
Organization of American States, the African Union, and the Economic
Community of West African States; and specialized international
organizations have formed, such as the WTO, WIPO, the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the International Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes.79 This expansion of global
organizations has affected the legal theory of statehood in another
manner: the fourth criterion of statehood, the capacity to enter into
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international relations, now requires State participation in global and
regional organizations.80

V. A New Theory of Statehood?
In light of the above, it may be argued that the legal theory of
statehood has evolved, constituting a Grotian Moment, and that the
theory today encompasses new elements. Statehood today encompasses,
in addition to the four criteria of the Montevideo Convention, the need
for recognition by super-sovereign States, demonstrated respect for
human and minority rights, as well as a commitment to abide by a set
world order. Entities which do not satisfy these novel criteria of
statehood remain de facto States, as the examples of Taiwan, Northern
Cyprus, Republika Srpska, South Ossetia and Abkhazia demonstrate.
First, statehood-seeking entities must garner the support of supersovereign States; the latter wield a tremendous amount of power in the
international arena, including the ability to block statehood requests
through the United Nations Security Council. Moreover, supersovereign States hold enormous military and economic powers and may
be in a position to support a State-like entity in its quest for statehood,
as well as to block another one from achieving statehood. For example,
Kosovo, supported by the United States and other western super
powers, has been able to easily assert independence from Serbia, as well
as to gain access to some international organizations.81 However,
because of the lack of Russian support, Kosovo has not been admitted
to the United Nations and has not achieved the full status of
statehood.82 Palestine, which faces prominent United States opposition,
has similarly been denied statehood, although this entity has become
an non-member observer State in the United Nations and has recently
succeeded in lobbying the International Criminal Court to treat it as a
State for the purposes of the Court’s jurisdiction.83 Often, State-seeking
80.
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sovereign decisions in international relations, a presupposition of statehood
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international legal norms, actors, and organizations.”).
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Prognosis, 4 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 93, 117, 120–27 (2012), for a
discussion on the prospects of Kosovo’s admission to the United Nations.
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entities must garner the support of regional super powers. For example,
when the former Yugoslav Republic, Macedonia, applied for recognition
within the European Union, Greece, its more powerful neighbor and
EU Member State objected to the use of the name Macedonia and
demanded that Macedonia change its name, as well as adopt a specific
constitutional provision promising that it would not seek additional
territory.84 This is an example of a more sovereign State (Greece)
pressuring a less powerful statehood-seeking entity into accepting
specific conditions on the latter’s ascension into statehood.85
Second, a statehood-seeking entity must demonstrate that it is
willing to respect human and minority rights. When the former Soviet
and Yugoslav republics applied for recognition within the EU, the latter
imposed, as a condition of recognition of these new States, the pledge
of respect of human and minority rights.86 Existing States have lost
parts of their territory because of their lack of respect for human and
minority rights, through intervention by super-sovereign States and the
international community. Thus, Serbia has de facto lost control over
Kosovo, because of the former’s repeated violations of human rights in
Kosovo and the NATO countries’ intervention in Kosovo, as well as
the United Nations’ involvement.87 It may be argued that Indonesia
would have kept territorial control over East Timor had it not engaged
in brutal human rights violations, which in turn invited the
international community’s involvement and led to the eventual
independence of East Timor.88 Thus, the lack of respect of human and
84.
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minority rights can lead toward an erosion of State sovereignty, and a
threat to a State’s continued existence.
Third, statehood-seeking entities must demonstrate their
willingness to participate in the existing world order and international
organizations. Because international law has proliferated, through an
expansion of legal norms and international organizations, it is
impossible for any State or State-like entity to function without
participating in this regime of norms, rules, and institutions. For
instance, it has become impossible to function in the international arena
outside of the United Nations, to trade without the World Trade
Organization’s involvement, and to attract investment outside of the
scope of investment treaties. Rogue States like North Korea or Syria,
because of their unwillingness to participate in the world order and
abide by legal and institutional norms, have become isolated and
incapable of conducting international relations. No State or State-like
entity can exist in a vacuum, and it may be argued that today’s criteria
for statehood encompass a requirement of respect for global order.
In sum, the theory of statehood has evolved, through a Grotian
Moment, to capture new criteria for statehood. These criteria include
the support of other super-sovereign States, the State’s willingness to
respect human and minority rights, and the State’s participation in the
existing world order and international organizations.

VI. Conclusion
The legal theory of statehood, developed in 1934 by the drafters of
the Montevideo Convention, has evolved over time, in light of
globalization forces and the proliferation of international legal norms
and institutions. Statehood in today’s world encompasses additional
criteria, which have become necessary for a State’s creation as well as
for its existence. Such additional criteria include the support of
powerful, super-sovereign States, the State’s willingness to respect
human and minority rights, and the State’s participation in the existing
global institutional order. This change in the legal theory of statehood
may constitute a Grotian Moment: a paradigm-shifting
reconceptualization brought about by specific factors in the global
arena, such as globalization and the proliferation of international law.

have been able to achieve independence and statehood. “Like in the case of
Serbia, it is reasonable to assume that had Indonesia been more respectful
of minority rights in East Timor, this island would not have been supported
in its struggle for secession and independence . . . . It is widely documented
that external actors and international organizations, like the U.N., played
a tremendously supportive role in aiding the East Timorese to secede from
Indonesia.” Sterio, supra note 20, at 226.
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